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SECURITY FOR THE FUTURE: LET'S GET OUR
AIRLINES FLYING
John Attanasio (Moderator)
G OOD AFTERNOON. My name is John Attanasio. I'd like
to welcome all of you to the Dedman School of Law at
SMU. Today's talk by Mr. Crandall is one part of a two-day sym-
posium that we're doing on airline security. Actually, the con-
ference will comprehend airline security and airline economics
issues, which are timely today, unhappily, and stem of course
from the tragedy of September 11 th. This conference is one in
a series of three conferences, which the School of Law is doing
on these issues. The second one will occur in February and will
be on terrorism's burdens on globalization. The third one will
occur in April. We'll discuss unilateral versus multilateral re-
sponses to global threats.
I would also urge those of you who are interested to come.
The third session is tomorrow at noon. From noon to 12:30,
there'll be a panel discussion. Al Casey will be on the panel, Dr.
Michael Cox, who's the senior economist for the Dallas Federal
Reserve Board. John Nance, the aviation editor for Good Morn-
ing America and a best-selling author, I'm proud to say, our grad-
uate will be modertaing. Ray Hutchinson will be another one of
the graduates of this law school and will be talking about air-
ports, the economic and safety impact on airports of the crisis,
so that should be a wonderful and timely discussion, as well.
Before I begin, I want to thank a number of folks. This con-
ference is being sponsored by The Journal of Air Law and Com-
merce. Evan Singer is the editor in chief, and Alisa Sheldon is the
managing editor. They're both here today. This particular ses-
sion is being co-sponsored with the new Corporate Law Associa-
tion, and Kristi Bracey is here today, who's the president of that
organization. Thank you all very, very much. I also want to ac-
knowledge Al Casey and John Nance, who have been instrumen-
tal in planning this conference. This was done on very short
notice. We're very grateful to them for all their help.
I want to welcome everyone to the lecture, and it's my great
honor to introduce Robert Crandall. Mr. Crandall is a native of
Usquepaug, Rhode Island. He's a 1957 graduate of the Univer-
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sity of Rhode Island, and received a Masters degree in business
from The Wharton School in 1960. He began his career as a
regional credit supervisor for Eastman Kodak, and later headed
the computer programming division at Hallmark Cards. In
1966, he joined TWA as assistant treasurer. He briefly left the
airline industry in 1972 to become senior financial officer at
Bloomingdale's department stores, but returned the following
year to join American Airlines as its senior vice president of fi-
nance. From there, he advanced to president and eventually
succeeded Albert Casey as chairman, CEO, and president of
American Airlines.
During his twenty-five year tenure with the airline, he was in-
strumental in introducing a number of changes, which revolu-
tionized the travel industry. Changes such as the computer
reservations system known as Sabre, which I'm sure we've all
used, the creation of Super-Saver fares, and the introduction of
the Frequent Flyer program. Mr. Crandall now serves on the
board of directors of Anixter International of Celestica, Inc., of
Clear Channel Communications, Inc., of the Howard Burton
Company, and of i2 Technologies. He also serves on the inter-
national advisory board of American International Group, Inc.
Mr. Crandall has been honored by many national and trade
publications such as-Business Week, Aviation Week, and Space Tech-
nology, Financial World, and Air Transport World for his achieve-
ments and his executive leadership. He received the Horatio
Alger Award in 1997, which honors individuals who have
achieved success despite challenging life circumstances. His talk
today is titled Security for the Future: Let's Get Our Airlines Flying. It
gives me great pleasure to introduce to all of you Robert
Crandall.
Robert Crandall
Thank you, and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
I am delighted to have this opportunity to join in a discussion
of how we can get our aviation system back to normal after the
dreadful events of September 11th. I wish we were here to dis-
cuss new air traffic control systems or the construction of new
runways and terminals or even the continuing growth of the bus-
iness. And I hope that in the not too distant future, we will have
an opportunity to do so. For now, however, our overriding con-
cern must be the question of how best to get both tourism and
the airline industry back in business.
SECURITY FOR THE FUTURE
As everyone knows, commercial aviation has always been a
challenging business. The pioneers of the business struggled to
establish a new industry, and in more modern times, the indus-
try's leaders have struggled to optimize system performance and
maximize its economic reach. While the airlines have seen
many hard times, I do not think it is an exaggeration to charac-
terize today's circumstances as the greatest challenge our avia-
tion system has ever faced.
For those of you who do not have day-to-day contact with this
data, let me remind you of a couple of numbers. The commer-
cial aviation business in the United States supports fifteen mil-
lion jobs in addition to the million or so jobs represented by the
airline employees. Those fifteen million jobs represent payrolls
of about $400 billion. That is why you hear about so many peo-
ple in so many communities around the country being out of
work. And those astonishing totals do not count the value of all
the business that is done, in this country and around the world,
because our commercial aviation system has made travel both
easy and relatively affordable. Those numbers tell us pretty
clearly that the health of our economy is absolutely dependent
on safe, reliable, convenient, and affordable air transportation.
Even before September 11th, the world's airlines and this
country's airlines were enmeshed in economic hard times. Ad-
ditionally, they were struggling with the issues of reliability and
convenience. Aviation has grown so rapidly and so many people
are traveling, that in recent years, the infrastructure of the
world's aviation industry has become inadequate. Thus, before
September 11 th, the public's principal complaint was "my flight
is late."
While the infrastructure issue remains a problem which must
be dealt with, the aviation industry is now struggling with differ-
ent and much more serious issues. First, is it worth the trouble?
Successfully dealing with those challenges will require:
* Formatting a fully satisfactory security plan, and
* Persuading policymakers, both here and in the United
States, to promptly and vigorously implement that plan.
Doing so is not going to be easy. Everybody seems to agree
that better security is important, but there is very little agree-
ment on the best solution. Moreover, the right solutions face
formidable obstacles of both ignorance and ideology.
Let me say first, that aviation is safer than it was before Sep-
tember 11th, and in absolute terms, it is safer than taking a
shower or driving to work. Then, let me follow up by acknowl-
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edging that it is not as safe as it can be and not as safe as it needs
to be. Further, much of what has been done since September
11th is, in my opinion, show rather than substance:
" We have National Guard troops on duty, but there is no
threat to which the National Guard can logically respond.
* There are many more screeners at the security points, but
they are badly paid, turn over very quickly, have very little
training, and are often working with equipment that is one
or two generations out of date.
" We temporarily stopped curbside bag check-in. But curb-
side bag check-in has no impact on the security problem.
There was a joke on the Internet, which some of you may
have heard, where it had Osama Bin Laden and his friends
sitting around in their caves. One turned to Osama and
said, "Look, Chief, we blew up the World Trade Center,
and they stopped curbside baggage check-in."
Such changes fall far short of what is needed. Moreover, the
public will not tolerate long, slow security lines forever. We
need to find a better way-and we need to do it soon!
Happily, work is underway on more substantive changes. On
the planes themselves, several changes have occurred:
" The cockpit doors on every airplane in the United States
airline fleet will soon be reinforced. To facilitate that
change, the FAA has waived a number of restrictions that
would have prevented prompt action.
* New in-flight procedures have been agreed upon, which
include a requirement that seatbelts be fastened during a
much higher percentage of the time passengers are on the
airplanes.
" Passengers will be prohibited from congregating in the
vestibule around the restroom doors and close to the cock-
pit, and
* Many more air marshals have been and are being hired.
* Cockpit crews across the industry are thinking about and
practicing aerobatic procedures, which will rather severely
discombobulate anybody who is causing problems in the
cabin.
There are also a number of other things under review:
" Cameras with which the cockpit members can see the
cabin,
* Flight attendant panic buttons;
* The arming of both cockpit and cabin crews with non-le-
thal weapons such Tasars and other steps.
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At the airport, unfortunately, less of substance has yet been
decided upon:
" Law enforcement officers have been stationed at every
checkpoint. But, like the National Guard, there is no se-
curity threat to which checkpoint law enforcement is re-
sponsive. This is an example of a change that is show, but
not substance.
* The FAA has agreed to expand the so-called caps pro-
gram-CAPS stands for "Computer Assisted Passenger
Screening"-to all passengers, rather than to only those
passengers who check baggage. This means that the num-
ber of selectees that drop out of the CAPS program-peo-
ple who display idiosyncratic patterns of either travel, or
reservations, or ticket purchasing-will rise from about
five percent to about ten percent. Those people will be
the subject of much more intensive search and
interrogation.
* The amount of carry-on baggage has been reduced.
* However-and this is key-Congress of the United States
has, as yet-more than a month after the horrible events
of September 1 Ith-failed to act to federalize responsibil-
ity for passenger, aircraft, and airport security. In myjudg-
ment, that is both disgraceful and ridiculous. It is even
more disgraceful that no one-not the FAA-not Con-
gress-not the special working groups-and not Governor
Ridge's new organization-has yet outlined a comprehen-
sive, fully integrated aviation security plan.
Such a plan must include several elements:
• First, it must mandate the collection of comprehensive
data on every passenger during the reservations and ticket-
ing process-before the passenger arrives at the airport.
* Airlines must be required to gather passenger names, ad-
dresses, phone numbers, driver's license numbers, pass-
port numbers-perhaps the number of a national identity
card-and then, they need to program their computers to
match that data against the travel habits of the passenger,
the FBI and CIA lists of suspected terrorists, and lists com-
piled by the U.S. Government of illegal immigrants and
expired Visa's. If we do not do that, ladies and gentlemen,
we will never be able to focus our screening resources-our
physical resources-on that small percentage of the pas-
sengers who represent a real security risk. And that is what
we do if we want a safe and convenient aviation system.
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* A comprehensive plan must also include professional, well-
paid, well-trained screeners. These people must be super-
vised and selected by the U.S. Government-but do not
necessarily need to be government employees.
* It must include secure operations areas, which means that
every door that goes from the terminal out to the area
where the airplanes are-an area known as "the ramp"-
must be absolutely secure.
• It must require that every person who works at an airport
be given a comprehensive, thorough background check
before they are allowed access to secure areas.
* It must require federal licensing of every contractor who
works on every airport.
* It must require examination of every bag and every pack-
age that goes into the belly of every airplane.
* Finally, a comprehensive plan must include a secure air-
plane. Things like secure cockpit doors, non-lethal weap-
ons, and the other things I have already mentioned.
To accomplish all that we must change some laws:
* We must change legislation, which prohibits banks and fi-
nancial institutions in the United States from sharing per-
sonal data with those who build the databases that the
airlines and security agents will need to determine who is a
threat.
" We must change federal legislation, and in some cases,
state legislation that prohibits the database aggregators
from having access to information gathered about those
who secure driver's licenses.
" We must also require that the federal government keep
track of everyone who is not a citizen of the United States.
How many of you know that people can come to the
United States on a student visa, or any other kind of visa,
and stay as long as they like? The United States of America
keeps no records. If we do not know who is in this coun-
try, legally or illegally, how can we expect to know who
might wish to blow up an airplane?
Does all of this represent a greater invasion of privacy than we
have been used to? Yes, it does. Does all of this mean discrimi-
nating between high and low-risk travelers? Yes, it does. How-
ever, as many people have said on many television channels and
written in both newspapers and news magazines, nothing will
ever be the same as it was before September 11th. And travel
cannot be either.
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On the other hand, travel need not be either extraordinarily
expensive or disconcertingly arduous. Once we have the right
kind of security system in place, the public will regain its confi-
dence, and the inconvenience imposed on low-risk passengers-
which means most of us-will be minimal. Once confidence
and convenience are restored, the public will go back to
traveling.
Airline costs must also be controlled, for only low costs can
sustain affordable prices. Labor costs, which have skyrocketed
in recent years, must be brought under control, and manage-
ment must move as quickly as possible to rebuild their schedules
and fully utilize their assets. We must also be certain that we do
not burden travelers with the costs of an improved security
system.
Unhappily, lots of folks in Washington cannot seem to under-
stand that forcing travelers to pay for the aviation security system
is self-defeating. The hue and cry from around the world about
lost traffic, lost revenue, and lost jobs is deafening. Given that
concern, I cannot understand-for the life of me-why Con-
gress seems intent on adding security surcharges to ticket prices.
It is now clear to everyone that community and every citizen-
whether they travel or not-shares in the economic benefits
spread by travelers. Thus, it should be equally clear to all that
aviation security costs should be paid from the general funds of
the U.S. Government. Making travel more expensive by adding
security surcharges does nothing but discourage travel, which is
the exact opposite of what we want to do.
President George W. Bush has said that this will be a long war.
And he is right. It will be a long war. Aviation's war will go on
forever. The system we need to put in place can never be al-
lowed to wither away. Its rules and regulations must be imple-
mented rigorously. There is no other way to rebuild the vitality
of the aviation business and the vitality of the U. S. economy.
To get this job done, we need fast, decisive action. We do not
need a wishy-washy political compromise.
I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is time for all of
us to understand that issue. It is time for everybody in this room
and everybody else who understands and cares about the vitality
of the aviation industry to get into the game. It is time to call
your representative and your senator and tell them to stop fool-
ing around and build an aviation security system that works.
Thank you very much.
2002]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Dean Attanasio has indicated that he would like to give you an
opportunity to raise any questions and make any comments you
would like, to which I will try to respond. For those of you who
are in the press, if you will refrain from participating in this part
of the program, I would appreciate it. I will meet separately with
you afterwards so we can give the students and the others from
the community here their time to ask whatever questions they
would like to. Fire away if anybody's interested.
Question and Answer Session
Q: If Congress doesn't get their act together and improve
security measures, what do you see the actions for the airlines to
be? How will we respond to that?
A: Well, if they do not pass appropriate security legislation,
we will continue, I assume, to sort of move along as we have.
What's happened to date is that we've got more security screen-
ers, but they are not better paid. They are not better trained.
They continue to turn over by taking better jobs every time they
get an opportunity. I think what you will see if the government
does not step up to this appropriately is that security will con-
tinue as in the past, which is very imperfect.
Now, even if it does step up and take control of some aspects
of the screening process, the screening process simply cannot
provide the kind of security that's required. We've got to have a
comprehensive plan. In my opinion, you have got to get a lot of
advance information. We have to know who you are before you
get to the airport. Then, when you get to the airport, we need a
means of confirming that you are who you say you are, which
can be done with fingerprints. It can be done with facial recog-
nition software. It can be done with retina scans.
Once we know about who you are, what your background is,
where you've been, and we have confirmed that you are who you
say you are, we can divide the world into high risk and low risk
suspects. We can then spend more substantial time questioning
those who represent a higher level of risk, which is exactly how
the Israelis do it who have certainly done the bestjob of anybody
in the world on this subject. That's the only way to build a real
security system. Unfortunately, Congress isn't even debating
that kind of bill.
Q: How do you feel about foreign ownership of airport se-
curity companies?
SECURITY FOR THE FUTURE
A: It doesn't make any difference to me who owns them as
long as they are appropriately licensed and regulated. The fact
of the matter is if you're going to - if we're going to use - for
example, if we end up with a system, which is what most of the
European governments do, where the government establishes
the rules and oversees the execution of those rules, most of the
companies that do the work are private enterprise companies. I
don't think there's a whole lot of difference between whether
those companies are owned by people in the United States or
whether they're owned by investors in Britain or elsewhere.
What is required is a level of background check, which today is
impractical because of some of the obstructions to data flowing
into the database aggregate and an almost complete lack of
compliance even with those rules that do exist. So the problem
is make the right rules and then enforce them originally.
Q: Would you be in favor of having like an aviation czar who
is responsible for seeing that these security things come about
from the government? There seems to be no individual now
[unintelligible].
A: I think what should happen is a separate aviation security
administration should be set up. That department should oper-
ate the aviation security system. I think it should be taken out of
the FAA, which in my judgment, has been proven incompetent.
Q: Mr. Crandall, you've mentioned the entity that will verify
my identity. You've said that before on [unintelligible] talk
shows. Do you propose a commercial entity such as a Sabre,
EDS, or IBM, or is that a government mandate under what
you've just said about -?
A: Once again I think that system would be selected and op-
erated under rules established by the government. I would as-
sume that the government would contract that out because the
government lacks the sophisticated data processing and commu-
nication skills that are required. But once again, it's what the
rules are and how those rules are enforced that is key, not who
actually does the work.
Q: [Inaudible]
A: For those of you who might not have heard the question,
the recruitment or the participation of passengers - well, let
me say this. I think the participation of untrained people in
physical confrontations is for the most part unwise. It doesn't
make a difference where they are. Untrained people rushing
into burning buildings are likely to get themselves seriously
burned and not do much good. So, I think the notion of sort of
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recruiting passengers to be a vigilante force is not a very good
idea. On the other hand, if you and I were on an airplane and
there was an untoward incident, somebody obviously was trying
to take over the airplane, I think you and I would probably join
in attacking them. So, without being a full-fledged vigilante, I
think we'd probably get after them. I mean, at least, in the short
term there's going to be a very high level of awareness of unto-
ward incidents on the airplane. I think passengers are much less
likely to be passive in the future than has been true in the past.
In the past, as you know, and I'm sure everybody in the room
knows, the pattern of hijacking has been don't resist the hijack-
ers because you can get hurt. And the hijackers are going to
land the airplane, and then we're going to deal with his or her
demands as the case may be. Now we've got a different pattern
of behavior where we don't know what the hijacker's going to
do with the airplane. I think under those circumstances every-
body on that airplane is going to resist much more stoutly than
was true in the past. I really don't think they need to be re-
cruited beforehand.
Q: [Inaudible] structure as it relates to passenger data and
the recovery of it [inaudible] suggests [inaudible] recognition
center, what would be a reasonable timeframe to replace the
current structure, and deal with the service cost [inaudible]?
A: Well, as I've said, I think all of the costs of the security
system should be paid from the general funds of the U. S. Gov-
ernment. You know, it's an absurdity to say that a company is
going to pay for anything. Companies don't pay for anything.
Companies collect money from passengers, buy and sell things,
construct goods, sell them, and distribute the money to their
shareholders. They don't pay for anything. To say that the air-
lines are going to pay for a security system is an absurdity.
They're not going to pay for a security system. They're going to
make the intermediate disbursements and pass it along to their
customers. That doesn't work because we know that the security
system as it exists today is competitive.
The fact is that one airline competes with another airline. No
airline can spend more than any other airline for security.
Thus, the system we have today doesn't work. The alternative
system being discussed in Washington is that the government
will be the intermediate payer, but the individual passengers will
pay it in the sense that there'll be a $5 or $10 charge on every
ticket.
SECURITY FOR THE FUTURE
Now, I've been out of the business too long to remember the
details, but we can tell you, the airlines can tell you precisely
how many people will stay home for each $1 of additional cost,
and it's a big number. It's not a trivial number. So, you put $10
more on the cost of every ticket, and millions of people won't fly
because it's too expensive. Instead of taking the husband or the
wife and the three kids and going to see grandma for the holi-
days, they just won't go. We know what those numbers are.
They're not a mystery.
If we say on the one hand that the economy is under a lot of
stress because waiters and housekeepers and cobblers and peo-
ple of every ilk are out of work because people are out traveling,
why would we want then to make travel more expensive and
thus, cause people to stay home and leave those people unem-
ployed? It just doesn't make any sense. The problem is we are
stuck in a Calvinist hair shirt idea. I think that those that appar-
ently benefit must pay is wrong.
Q: [Inaudible]
A: None. You want to travel on the airline system? You give
up your privacy. You don't want to give it up? Don't fly. Your
privacy isn't equal to the safety of the rest of us. As far as I'm
concerned, flying, which is voluntary, when you fly, you give up
your privacy rights if there's anything - there's nothing about
me I'm not happy to have you know anyway. If there's anything
about you that you don't want me to know, then don't fly.
Q: Would you comment on the United CEO stepping down?
A: I beg your pardon?
Q: On the United CEO stepping down?
A: No.
Q: Thank you.
A: Yes, sir? No. I won't comment on that. Thank you.
Q: How often were you [inaudible]
A: Well, I think we're talking about two things. I mean, I
really - as a matter of fact, I think we're talking about a num-
ber of things. In the first instance, we're talking about public
confidence, and my guess that - my guess is that most Ameri-
cans being natural optimists, and I think most Americans are
optimists, and most people recognizing the improbability of be-
ing on an airplane with a terrorist is about the equivalent of the
probability of bitten by a shark if you go swimming. My guess is
that confidence is only a part of the issue. There is certainly
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some part of the public that lacks complete confidence, but I
don't think at the moment it's very large.
The second part of the public is I think very adversely affected
by the simple convenience question. I mean, how much trouble
am I going to go to to go on this trip? And so you see a very
heavy resurgence of private aviation. You see a lot more people
driving to where they're going. The Amtrak ridership is up. A
bunch of people are just staying home. So, I think that conve-
nience factor combined with a desire for security is a big part of
it.
The fact is that a fairly large percentage of business travelers
are very, very much affected by convenience. They fly all the
time. If you're talking about adding an hour, hour-and-a-half,
two hours at each airport interface, you're talking about adding
lots of time, and you're looking at dramatic productivity decre-
ments. So, I think it's partially security. It is partially conve-
nience, and it's partially cost. You've got to keep in mind that
the troubles of the airline industry that are imminent, that are
now extant, which are real and dreadful, are partially attributa-
ble to September llth and partially attributable to the fact that
we've got a terrible recession.
Business travel in the United States was down by 40 percent
between January and June of 2001 absent September 1 1th. So,
you've got a combination of many factors, I think. I think all of
those factors can be dealt with only by the kind of comprehen-
sive security system. We've got to take the people who travel all
the time who are not a security risk and whisk them through the
airport, the interface process, and get them on the airplane, and
take the 5 or 10 or 15 percent of people that we're not sure of
where we need more serious interrogation, and work with and
on those people to try and isolate the problems the way the Is-
raelis do.
Q: Would you recommend requiring the same basic changes
to other means of transportation like rail or cruises?
A: Well, yes, except I think each mode has probably got a
different set of problems. I don't know as much about those
modes of travel, but the answer is yes. I think, for example,
cruise ships need to have reasonably tight security. You can't -
you don't want to be out in the middle of an ocean and sud-
denly find that somebody's blown the bottom out of the boat,
which would be a disaster. But the potential for far-reaching
damage is probably greater in aviation than in other aspects of
travel.
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But sure, I think every means of mass travel, every place where
masses of people congregate, we're going to have to have much
higher levels of security. I do not think you can do the same
kinds of things in a football stadium in terms of advance infor-
mation that you can in terms of the aviation system. I'm not
sure you can do the same kind of advanced reservations infor-
mation on buses or even on trains, because in some cases, they
don't depend on reservation systems. So, each one's going to
have to be adopted. But I think we're going to have to be care-
ful in all cases.
Q: Some of the solutions are long term for creation. What
problems would you see immediately in the establishment of a
volunteer corps of people? You know yourself, once an airline
person, always an airline person. You have a tremendous [inau-
dible] volunteers from every walk of life. What about stuff that
[inaudible] volunteer corps of ex-military, ex-airline?
A: Well, I think the answer to your question is that if the
federal government came along tomorrow and adopted this and
said, "Look, we've got to hire 20,000 people. And even if you
don't want a full-time job, all right, come work for us for six
months. We'll pay you $20 an hour, and we'll train you, but you
already know a lot about how airports function." So we're going
to go out and we're going to recruit these 20,000 people. We
hope we can recruit people that have had some airline experi-
ence. My guess is you'd get a very large response, even from
people that don't want to work full-time and say, "Sure. I'll work
the six months while you fill the corps out maybe." A bunch of
those people, I suspect, would like to work full-time on a contin-
uing basis.
Q: The Concorde is supposed to start flying next week. Do
you think that'll restore any confidence in the business traveler
if they know about it?
A: No, I don't. That won't have any effect. I think it will
benefit those who like to fly the Concorde back and forth be-
tween London and New York. But I don't think it will have any
effect. I mean, the Concorde problem was an engineering prob-
lem. It's been fixed. I think those people who like to fly Con-
corde will get back on it.
Q: Do you think it's a government [inaudible] quantifiable
ways [inaudible]?
A: Well, you have to keep in mind, the airlines are really not
a business. They're a club. They don't make any money. Now,
let me give you a number. This is a real number. Between the
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time that Orville and Wilbur first flew and the end of 1992, the
airline industry lost $13 billion. That was accumulative earnings
over time. Between then and now, they have made, I think,
about $28 billion, so they're moving back towards zero.
Now, the fact is no airline in any year that I know of, the air-
line industry has never returned its cost to capital. Are they go-
ing to give the money back? Airlines don't work that way. They
say, "My God, is there any way we could possibly make a profit
next month?" And everybody scrambles around and sees if they
could make a profit. So, the answer is they never have made
money. I don't expect they ever will make much money. The
fact of the matter is they will deal with their costs and revenues.
It isn't as if this is a hugely profitable business where they can
identify, "Oh, wow, here's this last little slice of our profits which
we should now give back because the government's going to pay
those bills." Itjust doesn't work that way. I mean, nothing that
I've told you is made up.
Q: The last three years [inaudible]
A: Even in the last three years, the airline industry, you com-
pare the airline industry's profits in the last three years with the
profits of any other major industry of comparable size, they're at
the bottom. They don't make any money.
Q: How many other current majors will still be in business,
or do you see them all -
A: Oh, I think they'll all be in existence. Airlines don't have
to make money. They're a cash flow business. Pam Am didn't
make money for eleven years, ten or eleven years before it went
out of business. These are big companies. They generate a lot
of cash. They're going to lose a lot of money over the next two
or three years. They will borrow that money. Their sharehold-
ers of course will suffer because the stock prices won't go up.
They're not going out of existence.
Look, the reason that the government stepped up and put $5
billion in cash into the airline business, I think, was this. I think
it was the right thing to do, but here's why they did it. It would
not have helped the collective psyche of the United States of
America and all its citizens if four or five major airlines had de-
clared bankruptcy three days after the September l1th event.
When you declare bankruptcy, you don't stop doing business.
You just say, "I'm not going to pay the people to whom I already
owe money." You do that to save your cash because in order to
keep running your business, you've got to have cash. You've got
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to pay for your fuel. You've got to pay salaries. You can't run off
the cash.
The government, I think, properly recognized that the air-
lines suddenly - I mean, some of you, many of you are not yet
in business. You're still in law school. Some of you are in busi-
ness. All of a sudden overnight your revenue's down 70 percent
and your costs are flat. Money's going out the door in a huge
gush. If somebody doesn't do something, you're going to run
out of cash. Then you won't be able to operate. Under those
circumstances, the responsible thing might very well be to de-
clare bankruptcy. I think the airline chief executives - I'm ob-
viously no longer part of that group - but I think they made
that case in Washington strongly. The consequence is that's
where the $5 billion came from.
Now, I'm less sure about the wisdom of the loan guarantees. I
don't necessarily think that's a good idea. The government's
sort of back in the business of regulating the airline industry.
The government says they want warrants, which are a claim to
buy common stock. I'm not sure that any of us want the U.S.
Government to be a shareholder in the airline industry because
after all, shareholders like to decide how things get done. Not a
good idea.
Q: [Inaudible] a big proponent of deregulation [inaudible].
Do you see that coming back?
A: Well, I don't know that it will come back. I mean, in the
late 1970s, those of us who didn't think deregulation was such a
red-hot idea made this point. I think over the years this point
has been proved out. If you deregulate the airline business, you
will get an entirely different result. You will likely get a more
efficient economic result. You will not get service to all the
places that you have today where service is required by the CAB.
And Senator Byrd is still trying to get service back to West Vir-
ginia. But the fact of the matter is I've told him, "Nobody goes
there because nobody wants to go there." He doesn't like to
hear that.
Anyway, a long story short, I think all of this federal involve-
ment inevitably will lead to more discussion of whether or not
there needs to be some regulation. Particularly, I think you'll
get that discussion if, as a consequence of this economic travail,
airlines seek to combine themselves. And if they seek to com-
bine themselves so that the number of competing airlines
shrinks, there may very well be a debate about whether some
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regulation to substitute for that now-absent competition is
required.
I hope it won't go back to a regulated system. I think the
deregulated system works better. It does not fulfill all the same
social objectives, but it gives us a materially better economic
result.
Q: Let's just play out the bankruptcy scenario. If some of
the airlines were to go bankrupt, clearly the obligations of the
trustee in bankruptcy are to cut back roots, right, and
therefore -
A: No, no, no. I don't know that the obligation of the trus-
tee is to cut back roots.
Q: But it may be. I mean, it may be to the extent -
A: Well, it's possible, yeah.
Q: It's very possible. To the extent you're seeing planes with
40 people on them, it's very possible that's part of their obliga-
tion. Assuming that they were, some airlines were to go into
bankruptcy, wouldn't we see even less travel than what we're see-
ing now? And what does that mean to an economy that is al-
ready at the edge?
A: Well, it's not clear that that would be the outcome. One
of the tactics of bankrupt airlines in the past - now we're in a
different era now, so who knows - but one of the tactics of
bankrupt airlines in the past when all these bankruptcies were
going on, they'd go bankrupt. The public would lose some level
of confidence in the idea that a bankrupt airline would cut
prices.
Every other airline would have to match prices. The bankrupt
carrier would cut some more prices. Everybody else would
match, as you have to do because this is a non-differentiated
product. The consequence is you can't let anybody have a price
advantage or all the business flows to the person with the price
advantage. And prices kept getting forced down and down and
down and down, which led in the long run to a great debate.
What are the bankruptcy laws accomplishing here? Are they
giving companies a second chance to start up? Or are they sim-
ply creating an instrument by which already failed companies
destroy companies that have not failed? I think it's the latter. I
don't think bankrupt companies should be allowed to continue
to operate. I think if they were not allowed to continue to oper-
ate, managements would be much more careful. Now they're
not careful. They say, "Well, if we make a mistake, you know,
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we'll go bankrupt. We'll get a break. We'll get rid of some debt.
We'll start again."
Q: [Inaudible]
A: Right, you're perfectly right. I don't know the answer to
that. Again I'm certainly not an expert on subways. As you
know, they had a Sarin gas incident on the Japanese subways
some years ago. Certainly, I would think that if somebody were
able, he or she could take a large container of weapons-grade
anthrax and explode it in the middle of Grand Central Station
in the middle of the rush hour, that it would have a dreadfully
deleterious effect. And I don't know how to protect against that
except to put more physical security around Grand Central and
to, in a crunch, you could put metal detectors and x-ray equip-
ment around Grand Central and at all of the stations. And
before anybody was allowed to bring boxes, packages onto the
train, they'd have to go through that device. My guess is if we
ever had the kind of incident we've just described, that would
happen.
Whether it will happen now is an open question. And I must
say to you I don't know the answer to that. I don't know
whether that possibility is sufficient tojustify the kind of security
that would be required to prevent it. In aviation - see, I think
the answer in aviation is more clear. We know we can do these
things. We know that if we put the right equipment in place
and the right people and build, structure the system right, we
can continue to operate an economical and convenient aviation
system and make it pretty - absolutely safe.
In other modes, we have greater problems. So, it seems to me
that we ought to continue to study those things. I assume there
are people, urban transportation people, that are looking at
those kinds of things. But I think it is a great grave mistake not
to do what we know how to do.
Q: To make a great point or rallying cry, we need to take
action and tell our representatives to do that.
A: Right.
Q: To let them know we're serious. To give one example,
the Israelis are doing it right and this notion of, this concept of
the business traveler or the frequent traveler having the ability
to maybe voluntarily give up their information [inaudible] -
A: Right, right.
Q: It's really helpful [inaudible], another good example of
[inaudible].
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A: Well, the Israelis have an exceptionally good system.
Most of the European systems are much tighter than the U.S.
system. In most of the European countries, the government sets
the rules, hires the screeners, and oversees the screeners. In'
most European countries, there are tighter restrictions on what-
you can take into the airport and so on than there are here.
Now, I don't think the European systems reach the level of that
which I think we should do here, but they're better than what
we're doing now.
Q: A lot of people are suggesting that domestic positive bag-
gage [inaudible]
A: Well, domestic positive bag match is whether or not every
- a passenger who gets on an - who checks a bag, whether you
should match the bag and the passenger on the airplane so that
a passenger cannot check a bag and then not get on the air-
plane, thus effectively putting an explosive device on the bag -
on the airplane. Yes, I think we should do a positive bag match.
I think we can do positive bag match. We can't do it tomorrow
because we're not equipped to do it. But I think in twelve to
eighteen months time, given the fact that you must do it, the
airlines can do that and not slow down the flow of traffic or the
flow of baggage onto the airplanes to a material extent. I think
we should do that.
I think it's a whole lot easier for an individual to check a bag
with a bomb in it and then get off the airplane. And that
doesn't require quite the level of self-sacrifice that blowing your-
self up does. So why make it easy?
Q: [Inaudible] on the safety of the flight [inaudible] segre-
gation of the cockpit in flight [inaudible]?
A: Well, you talk about a mechanical issue that could be re-
solved in the cabin. There may be people in the audience that
know the answer to that better than I. But there are very few, if
any, serious mechanical problems that could be solved by any-
body that's in the cockpit while the airplane is in flight simply by
coming into the cabin. There just aren't any. I mean, really
serious mechanical problems are in the engines or in the naviga-
tion systems. Those things are not accessible from the cabin
anyway. The only kind of mechanical thing is that pilots ever try
to fix are things like seats that won't slide backwards and for-
wards and lights that won't go out and doors that won't close.
But the fact is door-closing problems are on the ground, not in
the air because they're all plugged doors. You can't open the
door in the air anyway. So I think confining the crew to the
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cockpit entails little, if any, very little, and I think probably
none, risk of not having been able to intervene in a mechanical
situation in the cabin.
John, I think we've exhausted the group's questions.
John Attanasio
Bob, I want to thank you very, very much for a typically in-
formative presentation. I just wish for once you'd tell us what
you really think. Thank you very, very much.
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